From 8cea3f8b92c76432280b5432e1809219249e7381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: aarbit <aarbit@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 23:11:52 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Add local Supabase backend foundation: schema, RLS, and RLS
 tests

- supabase/config.toml: local dev stack config, pinned to the app's
  fixed dev server port, email confirmation required (hard
  verification gate per organized-ideas.md).
- Initial schema migration: profiles/roles, the public/private
  catalog tables (manufacturers, device categories, port types, cable
  types, device templates + ports) with the shared is_public/owner_id
  RLS pattern, a generalized catalog_submissions review-queue table,
  and diagrams as JSONB documents (+ collaborators, snapshots) rather
  than fully normalized -- see the migration's header comment for why.
- pgTAP RLS test suite (23 assertions) covering catalog visibility and
  promotion-in-place, diagram owner/collaborator/admin/super-admin
  visibility and edit permissions, submission visibility, and role
  escalation. Caught and fixed a real infinite-recursion bug between
  the diagrams and diagram_collaborators policies before this ever
  touched real data.
- vite.config.ts: pinned dev server port so Supabase Auth's redirect
  allow-list doesn't silently break if Vite floats to another port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017DUU6CnxECCDeqDNYJgr5x
---
 supabase/.gitignore                           |   8 +
 supabase/config.toml                          | 415 ++++++++++++++
 .../migrations/20260904215832_init_schema.sql | 519 ++++++++++++++++++
 supabase/tests/rls.sql                        | 245 +++++++++
 vite.config.ts                                |   7 +
 5 files changed, 1194 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 supabase/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 supabase/config.toml
 create mode 100644 supabase/migrations/20260904215832_init_schema.sql
 create mode 100644 supabase/tests/rls.sql

diff --git a/supabase/.gitignore b/supabase/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad9264f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Supabase
+.branches
+.temp
+
+# dotenvx
+.env.keys
+.env.local
+.env.*.local
diff --git a/supabase/config.toml b/supabase/config.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e5efc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/config.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+# For detailed configuration reference documentation, visit:
+# https://supabase.com/docs/guides/local-development/cli/config
+# A string used to distinguish different Supabase projects on the same host. Defaults to the
+# working directory name when running `supabase init`.
+project_id = "av-planner"
+
+[api]
+enabled = true
+# Port to use for the API URL.
+port = 54321
+# Schemas to expose in your API. Tables, views and stored procedures in this schema will get API
+# endpoints. `public` and `graphql_public` schemas are included by default.
+schemas = ["public", "graphql_public"]
+# Extra schemas to add to the search_path of every request.
+extra_search_path = ["public", "extensions"]
+# The maximum number of rows returns from a view, table, or stored procedure. Limits payload size
+# for accidental or malicious requests.
+max_rows = 1000
+# Controls whether new tables, views, sequences and functions created in the `public` schema by
+# `postgres` are reachable through the Data API roles (`anon`, `authenticated`, `service_role`)
+# without explicit GRANTs, matching the cloud default. Set to `false` to require explicit GRANTs
+# instead. Left unset, a fresh project falls back to `true`.
+# auto_expose_new_tables = true
+
+[api.tls]
+# Enable HTTPS endpoints locally using a self-signed certificate.
+enabled = false
+# Paths to self-signed certificate pair.
+# cert_path = "../certs/my-cert.pem"
+# key_path = "../certs/my-key.pem"
+
+[db]
+# Port to use for the local database URL.
+port = 54322
+# Port used by db diff command to initialize the shadow database.
+shadow_port = 54320
+# Maximum amount of time to wait for health check when starting the local database.
+health_timeout = "2m"
+# The database major version to use. This has to be the same as your remote database's. Run `SHOW
+# server_version;` on the remote database to check.
+major_version = 17
+
+[db.pooler]
+enabled = false
+# Port to use for the local connection pooler.
+port = 54329
+# Specifies when a server connection can be reused by other clients.
+# Configure one of the supported pooler modes: `transaction`, `session`.
+pool_mode = "transaction"
+# How many server connections to allow per user/database pair.
+default_pool_size = 20
+# Maximum number of client connections allowed.
+max_client_conn = 100
+
+# [db.vault]
+# secret_key = "env(SECRET_VALUE)"
+
+[db.migrations]
+# If disabled, migrations will be skipped during a db push or reset.
+enabled = true
+# Specifies an ordered list of schema files, directories, or glob patterns that describe your database.
+# Supports paths relative to supabase directory: "./schemas/*.sql", "./database".
+schema_paths = []
+
+[db.seed]
+# If enabled, seeds the database after migrations during a db reset.
+enabled = true
+# Specifies an ordered list of seed files to load during db reset.
+# Supports glob patterns relative to supabase directory: "./seeds/*.sql"
+sql_paths = ["./seed.sql"]
+
+[db.network_restrictions]
+# Enable management of network restrictions.
+enabled = false
+# List of IPv4 CIDR blocks allowed to connect to the database.
+# Defaults to allow all IPv4 connections. Set empty array to block all IPs.
+allowed_cidrs = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
+# List of IPv6 CIDR blocks allowed to connect to the database.
+# Defaults to allow all IPv6 connections. Set empty array to block all IPs.
+allowed_cidrs_v6 = ["::/0"]
+
+# Uncomment to reject non-secure connections to the database.
+# [db.ssl_enforcement]
+# enabled = true
+
+[realtime]
+enabled = true
+# Bind realtime via either IPv4 or IPv6. (default: IPv4)
+# ip_version = "IPv6"
+# The maximum length in bytes of HTTP request headers. (default: 4096)
+# max_header_length = 4096
+
+[studio]
+enabled = true
+# Port to use for Supabase Studio.
+port = 54323
+# External URL of the API server that frontend connects to.
+api_url = "http://127.0.0.1"
+# OpenAI API Key to use for Supabase AI in the Supabase Studio.
+openai_api_key = "env(OPENAI_API_KEY)"
+
+# Email testing server. Emails sent with the local dev setup are not actually sent - rather, they
+# are monitored, and you can view the emails that would have been sent from the web interface.
+[local_smtp]
+enabled = true
+# Port to use for the email testing server web interface.
+port = 54324
+# Uncomment to expose additional ports for testing user applications that send emails.
+# smtp_port = 54325
+# pop3_port = 54326
+# admin_email = "admin@email.com"
+# sender_name = "Admin"
+
+[storage]
+enabled = true
+# The maximum file size allowed (e.g. "5MB", "500KB").
+file_size_limit = "50MiB"
+
+# Uncomment to configure local storage buckets
+# [storage.buckets.images]
+# public = false
+# file_size_limit = "50MiB"
+# allowed_mime_types = ["image/png", "image/jpeg"]
+# objects_path = "./images"
+
+# Allow connections via S3 compatible clients
+[storage.s3_protocol]
+enabled = true
+
+# Image transformation API is available to Supabase Pro plan.
+# [storage.image_transformation]
+# enabled = true
+
+# Store analytical data in S3 for running ETL jobs over Iceberg Catalog
+# This feature is only available on the hosted platform.
+[storage.analytics]
+enabled = false
+max_namespaces = 5
+max_tables = 10
+max_catalogs = 2
+
+# Analytics Buckets is available to Supabase Pro plan.
+# [storage.analytics.buckets.my-warehouse]
+
+# Store vector embeddings in S3 for large and durable datasets
+[storage.vector]
+enabled = true
+max_buckets = 10
+max_indexes = 5
+
+# Vector Buckets is available to Supabase Pro plan.
+# [storage.vector.buckets.documents-openai]
+
+[auth]
+enabled = true
+# The base URL of your website. Used as an allow-list for redirects and for constructing URLs used
+# in emails.
+site_url = "http://127.0.0.1:5173"
+# The public URL that Auth serves on. Defaults to the API external URL with `/auth/v1` appended.
+# external_url = ""
+# A list of *exact* URLs that auth providers are permitted to redirect to post authentication.
+additional_redirect_urls = ["http://127.0.0.1:5173"]
+# How long tokens are valid for, in seconds. Defaults to 3600 (1 hour), maximum 604,800 (1 week).
+jwt_expiry = 3600
+# JWT issuer URL. If not set, defaults to auth.external_url.
+# jwt_issuer = ""
+# Path to JWT signing key. DO NOT commit your signing keys file to git.
+# signing_keys_path = "./signing_keys.json"
+# If disabled, the refresh token will never expire.
+enable_refresh_token_rotation = true
+# Allows refresh tokens to be reused after expiry, up to the specified interval in seconds.
+# Requires enable_refresh_token_rotation = true.
+refresh_token_reuse_interval = 10
+# Allow/disallow new user signups to your project.
+enable_signup = true
+# Allow/disallow anonymous sign-ins to your project.
+enable_anonymous_sign_ins = false
+# Allow/disallow testing manual linking of accounts
+enable_manual_linking = false
+# Passwords shorter than this value will be rejected as weak. Minimum 6, recommended 8 or more.
+minimum_password_length = 6
+# Passwords that do not meet the following requirements will be rejected as weak. Supported values
+# are: `letters_digits`, `lower_upper_letters_digits`, `lower_upper_letters_digits_symbols`
+password_requirements = ""
+
+# Configure passkey sign-ins.
+# [auth.passkey]
+# enabled = false
+
+# Configure WebAuthn relying party settings (required when passkey is enabled).
+# [auth.webauthn]
+# rp_display_name = "Supabase"
+# rp_id = "localhost"
+# rp_origins = ["http://127.0.0.1:3000"]
+
+[auth.rate_limit]
+# Number of emails that can be sent per hour. Requires auth.email.smtp to be enabled.
+email_sent = 2
+# Number of SMS messages that can be sent per hour. Requires auth.sms to be enabled.
+sms_sent = 30
+# Number of anonymous sign-ins that can be made per hour per IP address. Requires enable_anonymous_sign_ins = true.
+anonymous_users = 30
+# Number of sessions that can be refreshed in a 5 minute interval per IP address.
+token_refresh = 150
+# Number of sign up and sign-in requests that can be made in a 5 minute interval per IP address (excludes anonymous users).
+sign_in_sign_ups = 30
+# Number of OTP / Magic link verifications that can be made in a 5 minute interval per IP address.
+token_verifications = 30
+# Number of Web3 logins that can be made in a 5 minute interval per IP address.
+web3 = 30
+
+# Configure one of the supported captcha providers: `hcaptcha`, `turnstile`.
+# [auth.captcha]
+# enabled = true
+# provider = "hcaptcha"
+# secret = ""
+
+[auth.email]
+# Allow/disallow new user signups via email to your project.
+enable_signup = true
+# If enabled, a user will be required to confirm any email change on both the old, and new email
+# addresses. If disabled, only the new email is required to confirm.
+double_confirm_changes = true
+# If enabled, users need to confirm their email address before signing in.
+# Enabled per organized-ideas.md §2: email verification is a hard gate before
+# first use for manual signups (Google-SSO users are implicitly verified).
+enable_confirmations = true
+# If enabled, users will need to reauthenticate or have logged in recently to change their password.
+secure_password_change = false
+# Controls the minimum amount of time that must pass before sending another signup confirmation or password reset email.
+max_frequency = "1s"
+# Number of characters used in the email OTP.
+otp_length = 6
+# Number of seconds before the email OTP expires (defaults to 1 hour).
+otp_expiry = 3600
+
+# Use a production-ready SMTP server
+# [auth.email.smtp]
+# enabled = true
+# host = "smtp.sendgrid.net"
+# port = 587
+# user = "apikey"
+# pass = "env(SENDGRID_API_KEY)"
+# admin_email = "admin@email.com"
+# sender_name = "Admin"
+
+# Uncomment to customize email template
+# [auth.email.template.invite]
+# subject = "You have been invited"
+# content_path = "./supabase/templates/invite.html"
+
+# Uncomment to customize notification email template
+# [auth.email.notification.password_changed]
+# enabled = true
+# subject = "Your password has been changed"
+# content_path = "./supabase/templates/password_changed_notification.html"
+
+[auth.sms]
+# Allow/disallow new user signups via SMS to your project.
+enable_signup = false
+# If enabled, users need to confirm their phone number before signing in.
+enable_confirmations = false
+# Template for sending OTP to users
+template = "Your code is {{ .Code }}"
+# Controls the minimum amount of time that must pass before sending another sms otp.
+max_frequency = "5s"
+
+# Use pre-defined map of phone number to OTP for testing.
+# [auth.sms.test_otp]
+# 4152127777 = "123456"
+
+# Configure logged in session timeouts.
+# [auth.sessions]
+# Force log out after the specified duration.
+# timebox = "24h"
+# Force log out if the user has been inactive longer than the specified duration.
+# inactivity_timeout = "8h"
+
+# This hook runs before a new user is created and allows developers to reject the request based on the incoming user object.
+# [auth.hook.before_user_created]
+# enabled = true
+# uri = "pg-functions://postgres/auth/before-user-created-hook"
+
+# This hook runs before a token is issued and allows you to add additional claims based on the authentication method used.
+# [auth.hook.custom_access_token]
+# enabled = true
+# uri = "pg-functions://<database>/<schema>/<hook_name>"
+
+# Configure one of the supported SMS providers: `twilio`, `twilio_verify`, `messagebird`, `textlocal`, `vonage`.
+[auth.sms.twilio]
+enabled = false
+account_sid = ""
+message_service_sid = ""
+# DO NOT commit your Twilio auth token to git. Use environment variable substitution instead:
+auth_token = "env(SUPABASE_AUTH_SMS_TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN)"
+
+# Multi-factor-authentication is available to Supabase Pro plan.
+[auth.mfa]
+# Control how many MFA factors can be enrolled at once per user.
+max_enrolled_factors = 10
+
+# Control MFA via App Authenticator (TOTP)
+[auth.mfa.totp]
+enroll_enabled = false
+verify_enabled = false
+
+# Configure MFA via Phone Messaging
+[auth.mfa.phone]
+enroll_enabled = false
+verify_enabled = false
+otp_length = 6
+template = "Your code is {{ .Code }}"
+max_frequency = "5s"
+
+# Configure MFA via WebAuthn
+# [auth.mfa.web_authn]
+# enroll_enabled = true
+# verify_enabled = true
+
+# Use an external OAuth provider. The full list of providers are: `apple`, `azure`, `bitbucket`,
+# `discord`, `facebook`, `github`, `gitlab`, `google`, `keycloak`, `linkedin_oidc`, `notion`, `twitch`,
+# `twitter`, `x`, `slack`, `spotify`, `workos`, `zoom`.
+[auth.external.apple]
+enabled = false
+client_id = ""
+# DO NOT commit your OAuth provider secret to git. Use environment variable substitution instead:
+secret = "env(SUPABASE_AUTH_EXTERNAL_APPLE_SECRET)"
+# Overrides the default auth callback URL derived from auth.external_url.
+redirect_uri = ""
+# Overrides the default auth provider URL. Used to support self-hosted gitlab, single-tenant Azure,
+# or any other third-party OIDC providers.
+url = ""
+# If enabled, the nonce check will be skipped. Required for local sign in with Google auth.
+skip_nonce_check = false
+# If enabled, it will allow the user to successfully authenticate when the provider does not return an email address.
+email_optional = false
+
+# Allow Solana wallet holders to sign in to your project via the Sign in with Solana (SIWS, EIP-4361) standard.
+# You can configure "web3" rate limit in the [auth.rate_limit] section and set up [auth.captcha] if self-hosting.
+[auth.web3.solana]
+enabled = false
+
+# Use Firebase Auth as a third-party provider alongside Supabase Auth.
+[auth.third_party.firebase]
+enabled = false
+# project_id = "my-firebase-project"
+
+# Use Auth0 as a third-party provider alongside Supabase Auth.
+[auth.third_party.auth0]
+enabled = false
+# tenant = "my-auth0-tenant"
+# tenant_region = "us"
+
+# Use AWS Cognito (Amplify) as a third-party provider alongside Supabase Auth.
+[auth.third_party.aws_cognito]
+enabled = false
+# user_pool_id = "my-user-pool-id"
+# user_pool_region = "us-east-1"
+
+# Use Clerk as a third-party provider alongside Supabase Auth.
+[auth.third_party.clerk]
+enabled = false
+# Obtain from https://clerk.com/setup/supabase
+# domain = "example.clerk.accounts.dev"
+
+# OAuth server configuration
+[auth.oauth_server]
+# Enable OAuth server functionality
+enabled = false
+# Path for OAuth consent flow UI
+authorization_url_path = "/oauth/consent"
+# Allow dynamic client registration
+allow_dynamic_registration = false
+
+[edge_runtime]
+enabled = true
+# Supported request policies: `oneshot`, `per_worker`.
+# `per_worker` (default) — enables hot reload during local development.
+# `oneshot` — fallback mode if hot reload causes issues (e.g. in large repos or with symlinks).
+policy = "per_worker"
+# Port to attach the Chrome inspector for debugging edge functions.
+inspector_port = 8083
+# The Deno major version to use.
+deno_version = 2
+
+# [edge_runtime.secrets]
+# secret_key = "env(SECRET_VALUE)"
+
+[analytics]
+enabled = true
+port = 54327
+# Configure one of the supported backends: `postgres`, `bigquery`.
+backend = "postgres"
+
+# Experimental features may be deprecated any time
+[experimental]
+# Configures Postgres storage engine to use OrioleDB (S3)
+orioledb_version = ""
+# Configures S3 bucket URL, eg. <bucket_name>.s3-<region>.amazonaws.com
+s3_host = "env(S3_HOST)"
+# Configures S3 bucket region, eg. us-east-1
+s3_region = "env(S3_REGION)"
+# Configures AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID for S3 bucket
+s3_access_key = "env(S3_ACCESS_KEY)"
+# Configures AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY for S3 bucket
+s3_secret_key = "env(S3_SECRET_KEY)"
+
+# pg-delta is the schema diff engine for db diff / db pull / db remote commit.
+# Set enabled = false to fall back to the legacy migra engine.
+[experimental.pgdelta]
+enabled = true
+# Directory under `supabase/` where declarative files are written.
+# declarative_schema_path = "./schemas"
+# JSON string passed through to pg-delta SQL formatting.
+# format_options = "{\"keywordCase\":\"upper\",\"indent\":2,\"maxWidth\":80,\"commaStyle\":\"trailing\"}"
diff --git a/supabase/migrations/20260904215832_init_schema.sql b/supabase/migrations/20260904215832_init_schema.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1c89f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/migrations/20260904215832_init_schema.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+-- Initial schema for AV Planner's backend, per organized-ideas.md.
+--
+-- Two different shapes on purpose:
+--   * Catalog entities (manufacturers, categories, port types, cable types,
+--     device templates) are fully relational rows, because they must be
+--     independently browsable, searchable, and moderated one row at a time
+--     (the public/private + submission-for-review workflow).
+--   * Diagrams are a JSONB document per row. A diagram's devices/ports/
+--     connections already carry copied-in data rather than live references
+--     (the "snapshot at time of use" decision), so they're inherently
+--     document-shaped, not relational — and RLS only ever needs to gate
+--     access at the whole-diagram level (owner + collaborators), never at
+--     the level of one device or cable inside it, so normalizing would add
+--     complexity without adding any real security granularity.
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- profiles — one row per auth.users row. Username is separate from email
+-- (organized-ideas.md §2) and unique. Account suspension uses Supabase
+-- Auth's own built-in ban mechanism (auth.users.banned_until, set via the
+-- Admin API with the service role key) rather than a column here — no need
+-- to reinvent it.
+-- ============================================================================
+
+create table public.profiles (
+  id uuid primary key references auth.users (id) on delete cascade,
+  username text not null unique,
+  role text not null default 'regular' check (role in ('regular', 'admin', 'super_admin')),
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+-- Helper functions used throughout the RLS policies below. Defined here,
+-- right after `profiles` exists, since a `language sql` function's body is
+-- validated against the schema at CREATE FUNCTION time.
+create or replace function public.current_user_role()
+returns text
+language sql
+stable
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+as $$
+  select role from public.profiles where id = auth.uid();
+$$;
+
+create or replace function public.is_admin()
+returns boolean
+language sql
+stable
+as $$
+  select coalesce(public.current_user_role() in ('admin', 'super_admin'), false);
+$$;
+
+create or replace function public.is_super_admin()
+returns boolean
+language sql
+stable
+as $$
+  select coalesce(public.current_user_role() = 'super_admin', false);
+$$;
+
+alter table public.profiles enable row level security;
+
+-- Anyone can read their own profile; Super Admins can read everyone's
+-- (Admins get no special profile visibility — their power is scoped to
+-- catalog submissions, not user accounts, per the role table in §2/§6).
+create policy "profiles_select_self_or_super_admin"
+  on public.profiles for select
+  using (id = auth.uid() or public.is_super_admin());
+
+-- Users can update their own profile (e.g. username); Super Admins can
+-- update anyone's (e.g. role changes). Role escalation by a non-super-admin
+-- is blocked by the WITH CHECK clause, not just the USING clause.
+create policy "profiles_update_self_or_super_admin"
+  on public.profiles for update
+  using (id = auth.uid() or public.is_super_admin())
+  with check (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or (id = auth.uid() and role = (select role from public.profiles where id = auth.uid()))
+  );
+
+-- Row creation happens via the trigger below, not direct client inserts.
+-- Deletion happens by deleting the auth.users row (via the Admin API),
+-- which cascades here — no direct delete policy needed.
+
+-- Auto-create a profile when a new auth user is created. Username comes
+-- from signup metadata (`options.data.username`) for manual signup; for
+-- Google SSO, the frontend collects a username up front and passes it the
+-- same way (per §2: "username collected up front, email pulled from Google").
+create or replace function public.handle_new_user()
+returns trigger
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+as $$
+begin
+  insert into public.profiles (id, username)
+  values (new.id, new.raw_user_meta_data ->> 'username');
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+create trigger on_auth_user_created
+  after insert on auth.users
+  for each row execute function public.handle_new_user();
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- Catalog entities: manufacturers, device_categories, port_types,
+-- cable_types, device_templates (+ device_template_ports).
+--
+-- Shared shape and RLS pattern across all of them:
+--   * is_public + owner_id (null owner = seeded/system row)
+--   * SELECT: visible if public, or you own it, or you're an Admin+
+--   * INSERT: you can always create your own private (is_public = false)
+--     row; only Admins+ can insert directly as public
+--   * UPDATE: you can edit your own row while it's still private; once
+--     public, only Admins+ can edit it (that's what "promote in place"
+--     during submission review does — see catalog_submissions below)
+--   * DELETE: same shape as UPDATE
+-- ============================================================================
+
+create table public.manufacturers (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  is_public boolean not null default false,
+  owner_id uuid references public.profiles (id) on delete set null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+create unique index manufacturers_public_name_key on public.manufacturers (lower(name)) where is_public;
+
+alter table public.manufacturers enable row level security;
+
+create policy "manufacturers_select" on public.manufacturers for select
+  using (is_public or owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "manufacturers_insert" on public.manufacturers for insert
+  with check (
+    (owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public)
+    or (public.is_admin() and is_public)
+  );
+
+create policy "manufacturers_update" on public.manufacturers for update
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin())
+  with check ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "manufacturers_delete" on public.manufacturers for delete
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create table public.device_categories (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  is_public boolean not null default false,
+  owner_id uuid references public.profiles (id) on delete set null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+create unique index device_categories_public_name_key on public.device_categories (lower(name)) where is_public;
+
+alter table public.device_categories enable row level security;
+
+create policy "device_categories_select" on public.device_categories for select
+  using (is_public or owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "device_categories_insert" on public.device_categories for insert
+  with check (
+    (owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public)
+    or (public.is_admin() and is_public)
+  );
+
+create policy "device_categories_update" on public.device_categories for update
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin())
+  with check ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "device_categories_delete" on public.device_categories for delete
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create table public.port_types (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  category text not null check (category in ('video', 'audio', 'network', 'usb', 'power', 'control', 'other')),
+  family text not null,
+  compatible_family_ids text[] not null default '{}',
+  max_connections integer,
+  is_public boolean not null default false,
+  owner_id uuid references public.profiles (id) on delete set null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.port_types enable row level security;
+
+create policy "port_types_select" on public.port_types for select
+  using (is_public or owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "port_types_insert" on public.port_types for insert
+  with check (
+    (owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public)
+    or (public.is_admin() and is_public)
+  );
+
+create policy "port_types_update" on public.port_types for update
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin())
+  with check ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "port_types_delete" on public.port_types for delete
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create table public.cable_types (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  family text not null,
+  family2 text,
+  unit text not null check (unit in ('ft', 'm')),
+  cost_per_unit numeric(10, 2),
+  is_public boolean not null default false,
+  owner_id uuid references public.profiles (id) on delete set null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.cable_types enable row level security;
+
+create policy "cable_types_select" on public.cable_types for select
+  using (is_public or owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "cable_types_insert" on public.cable_types for insert
+  with check (
+    (owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public)
+    or (public.is_admin() and is_public)
+  );
+
+create policy "cable_types_update" on public.cable_types for update
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin())
+  with check ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "cable_types_delete" on public.cable_types for delete
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create table public.device_templates (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  category_id uuid not null references public.device_categories (id),
+  manufacturer_id uuid references public.manufacturers (id),
+  model text,
+  cost numeric(10, 2),
+  is_public boolean not null default false,
+  owner_id uuid references public.profiles (id) on delete set null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.device_templates enable row level security;
+
+create policy "device_templates_select" on public.device_templates for select
+  using (is_public or owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "device_templates_insert" on public.device_templates for insert
+  with check (
+    (owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public)
+    or (public.is_admin() and is_public)
+  );
+
+create policy "device_templates_update" on public.device_templates for update
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin())
+  with check ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "device_templates_delete" on public.device_templates for delete
+  using ((owner_id = auth.uid() and not is_public) or public.is_admin());
+
+-- A device template's ports inherit their parent template's visibility —
+-- there's no independent is_public/owner_id here, just a join back up.
+create table public.device_template_ports (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  device_template_id uuid not null references public.device_templates (id) on delete cascade,
+  name text not null,
+  direction text not null check (direction in ('input', 'output', 'bidirectional')),
+  port_type_id uuid not null references public.port_types (id),
+  sort_order integer not null default 0
+);
+
+alter table public.device_template_ports enable row level security;
+
+create policy "device_template_ports_select" on public.device_template_ports for select
+  using (
+    exists (
+      select 1 from public.device_templates dt
+      where dt.id = device_template_id
+        and (dt.is_public or dt.owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin())
+    )
+  );
+
+create policy "device_template_ports_insert" on public.device_template_ports for insert
+  with check (
+    exists (
+      select 1 from public.device_templates dt
+      where dt.id = device_template_id
+        and ((dt.owner_id = auth.uid() and not dt.is_public) or public.is_admin())
+    )
+  );
+
+create policy "device_template_ports_update" on public.device_template_ports for update
+  using (
+    exists (
+      select 1 from public.device_templates dt
+      where dt.id = device_template_id
+        and ((dt.owner_id = auth.uid() and not dt.is_public) or public.is_admin())
+    )
+  );
+
+create policy "device_template_ports_delete" on public.device_template_ports for delete
+  using (
+    exists (
+      select 1 from public.device_templates dt
+      where dt.id = device_template_id
+        and ((dt.owner_id = auth.uid() and not dt.is_public) or public.is_admin())
+    )
+  );
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- catalog_submissions — one generalized review-queue table covering all
+-- five catalog entity types (rather than five near-identical submission
+-- tables), per §3: diff-against-current review UX, notify either way,
+-- promote-in-place on approval, rejected stays editable for resubmission.
+-- `entity_id` is null for a brand-new proposed entry, set for a proposed
+-- edit to an existing public entry. `proposed_data` holds the submitted
+-- fields as JSON; the diff view is computed at the app layer by comparing
+-- it against the current live row (if entity_id is set).
+-- ============================================================================
+
+create table public.catalog_submissions (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  entity_type text not null check (
+    entity_type in ('device_template', 'port_type', 'cable_type', 'device_category', 'manufacturer')
+  ),
+  entity_id uuid,
+  proposed_data jsonb not null,
+  submitter_id uuid not null references public.profiles (id) on delete cascade,
+  status text not null default 'pending' check (status in ('pending', 'approved', 'rejected')),
+  reviewer_id uuid references public.profiles (id),
+  review_reason text,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.catalog_submissions enable row level security;
+
+create policy "catalog_submissions_select" on public.catalog_submissions for select
+  using (submitter_id = auth.uid() or public.is_admin());
+
+create policy "catalog_submissions_insert" on public.catalog_submissions for insert
+  with check (submitter_id = auth.uid() and status = 'pending');
+
+-- Submitter can revise their own pending/rejected submission (e.g. edit
+-- proposed_data and flip status back to 'pending' after a rejection).
+-- Admins can update any submission (approve/reject, set reviewer_id/
+-- review_reason) — actually applying an approval to the live catalog row
+-- is separate application logic, not something RLS does on its own.
+create policy "catalog_submissions_update" on public.catalog_submissions for update
+  using (
+    (submitter_id = auth.uid() and status in ('pending', 'rejected'))
+    or public.is_admin()
+  )
+  with check (
+    (submitter_id = auth.uid() and status in ('pending', 'rejected'))
+    or public.is_admin()
+  );
+
+-- Submitter can withdraw their own still-pending submission.
+create policy "catalog_submissions_delete" on public.catalog_submissions for delete
+  using (submitter_id = auth.uid() and status = 'pending');
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- diagrams — JSONB document per diagram (see file header for why).
+-- ============================================================================
+
+create table public.diagrams (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  name text not null,
+  owner_id uuid not null references public.profiles (id) on delete cascade,
+  data jsonb not null,
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+-- Created here (before diagrams' own RLS policies) because those policies
+-- need to reference it — table existence is checked at CREATE POLICY time,
+-- same as it was for the helper functions above. Its own RLS/policies are
+-- defined further down, once `diagrams` policies no longer need editing.
+create table public.diagram_collaborators (
+  diagram_id uuid not null references public.diagrams (id) on delete cascade,
+  user_id uuid not null references public.profiles (id) on delete cascade,
+  permission text not null check (permission in ('view', 'edit')),
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now(),
+  primary key (diagram_id, user_id)
+);
+
+-- `diagrams` and `diagram_collaborators` policies each need to check the
+-- other table (is this user a collaborator? / does this user own the
+-- diagram?). A direct correlated subquery from one RLS-protected table into
+-- another RLS-protected table that itself queries back is a well-known
+-- Postgres RLS trap: each table's policy re-triggers the other's, forever
+-- ("infinite recursion detected in policy for relation..."). The fix is to
+-- route the cross-table check through a SECURITY DEFINER function — it runs
+-- as the function's owner (postgres, which bypasses RLS as the table
+-- owner), so the lookup inside it never re-enters either policy.
+create or replace function public.diagram_owner_id(p_diagram_id uuid)
+returns uuid
+language sql
+stable
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+as $$
+  select owner_id from public.diagrams where id = p_diagram_id;
+$$;
+
+create or replace function public.diagram_collaborator_permission(p_diagram_id uuid, p_user_id uuid)
+returns text
+language sql
+stable
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+as $$
+  select permission from public.diagram_collaborators
+  where diagram_id = p_diagram_id and user_id = p_user_id;
+$$;
+
+alter table public.diagrams enable row level security;
+
+create policy "diagrams_select" on public.diagrams for select
+  using (
+    owner_id = auth.uid()
+    or public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_collaborator_permission(id, auth.uid()) is not null
+  );
+
+create policy "diagrams_insert" on public.diagrams for insert
+  with check (owner_id = auth.uid());
+
+create policy "diagrams_update" on public.diagrams for update
+  using (
+    owner_id = auth.uid()
+    or public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_collaborator_permission(id, auth.uid()) = 'edit'
+  );
+
+create policy "diagrams_delete" on public.diagrams for delete
+  using (owner_id = auth.uid() or public.is_super_admin());
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- diagram_collaborators — per-collaborator view/edit permission (§8).
+-- Only the diagram's owner (or a Super Admin) manages the collaborator
+-- list; a collaborator can see their own membership row but can't add
+-- others, matching "the owner picks who has access" from the plan.
+-- ============================================================================
+
+alter table public.diagram_collaborators enable row level security;
+
+create policy "diagram_collaborators_select" on public.diagram_collaborators for select
+  using (
+    user_id = auth.uid()
+    or public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+  );
+
+create policy "diagram_collaborators_insert" on public.diagram_collaborators for insert
+  with check (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+  );
+
+create policy "diagram_collaborators_update" on public.diagram_collaborators for update
+  using (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+  );
+
+create policy "diagram_collaborators_delete" on public.diagram_collaborators for delete
+  using (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+  );
+
+-- ============================================================================
+-- diagram_snapshots — rolling undo/recovery history (§8). Immutable once
+-- written (no update policy); retention/pruning to "recent" snapshots is a
+-- scheduled job running as service_role (bypasses RLS entirely), not
+-- modeled here — this table just needs to accept writes and be readable by
+-- whoever can already see/edit the diagram.
+-- ============================================================================
+
+create table public.diagram_snapshots (
+  id uuid primary key default gen_random_uuid(),
+  diagram_id uuid not null references public.diagrams (id) on delete cascade,
+  data jsonb not null,
+  saved_by uuid references public.profiles (id),
+  created_at timestamptz not null default now()
+);
+
+alter table public.diagram_snapshots enable row level security;
+
+-- Same recursion trap as diagrams/diagram_collaborators applies here too
+-- (this table's policy would otherwise correlated-subquery into both of
+-- those RLS-protected tables) — routed through the same SECURITY DEFINER
+-- helper functions for the same reason.
+create policy "diagram_snapshots_select" on public.diagram_snapshots for select
+  using (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+    or public.diagram_collaborator_permission(diagram_id, auth.uid()) is not null
+  );
+
+create policy "diagram_snapshots_insert" on public.diagram_snapshots for insert
+  with check (
+    public.is_super_admin()
+    or public.diagram_owner_id(diagram_id) = auth.uid()
+    or public.diagram_collaborator_permission(diagram_id, auth.uid()) = 'edit'
+  );
diff --git a/supabase/tests/rls.sql b/supabase/tests/rls.sql
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d50869
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/tests/rls.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+-- RLS policy tests (pgTAP), per organized-ideas.md §1: "automated tests
+-- specifically for the RLS policies... the actual security boundary once
+-- roles matter." Run with: supabase test db
+--
+-- device_categories is used as the representative test for the shared
+-- catalog pattern (manufacturers/port_types/cable_types/device_templates
+-- all use the identical is_public/owner_id policy shape) rather than
+-- repeating the same assertions five times.
+--
+-- Approach: fixture users/rows are set up as the postgres superuser (which
+-- bypasses RLS entirely), then we switch to the `authenticated` role and
+-- impersonate each fixture user in turn by setting the JWT `sub` claim that
+-- auth.uid() reads — the same mechanism Supabase's own runtime uses.
+--
+-- Note on UPDATE/DELETE vs. INSERT RLS failures: an INSERT whose new row
+-- fails WITH CHECK always raises 42501. An UPDATE/DELETE whose target row
+-- doesn't satisfy USING is simply excluded from the statement — 0 rows
+-- affected, no error. Only an UPDATE where USING passes (the row is yours
+-- to touch) but the *new* values fail WITH CHECK actually throws. Tests
+-- below use throws_ok only for genuine WITH CHECK failures, and a plain
+-- update-then-assert-unchanged for the "you can't even touch this row"
+-- case.
+
+begin;
+
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+
+select plan(23);
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Fixtures (as postgres — RLS does not apply)
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+insert into auth.users (id, email, raw_user_meta_data) values
+  ('11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', 'alice@example.com', '{"username":"alice"}'),
+  ('22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', 'bob@example.com', '{"username":"bob"}'),
+  ('33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333', 'carol@example.com', '{"username":"carol_admin"}'),
+  ('44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444', 'dave@example.com', '{"username":"dave_superadmin"}');
+
+update public.profiles set role = 'admin' where id = '33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
+update public.profiles set role = 'super_admin' where id = '44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444';
+
+-- Everything from here on runs as the `authenticated` role, with auth.uid()
+-- controlled by the JWT sub claim we set before each block.
+set local role authenticated;
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Catalog pattern (device_categories as the representative case)
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.device_categories (id, name, owner_id, is_public)
+     values ('a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'Alice Test Category', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', false) $$,
+  'alice can insert her own private category'
+);
+
+select throws_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.device_categories (name, owner_id, is_public)
+     values ('Sneaky Public Category', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true) $$,
+  '42501'::char(5), null,
+  'alice cannot insert a public category directly'
+);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.device_categories where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  1,
+  'alice can see her own private category'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.device_categories where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  0,
+  'bob cannot see alice''s private category'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select throws_ok(
+  $$ update public.device_categories set is_public = true where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' $$,
+  '42501'::char(5), null,
+  'alice cannot self-promote her category to public'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ update public.device_categories set is_public = true where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' $$,
+  'carol (admin) can promote alice''s category to public in place'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.device_categories where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  1,
+  'bob can see the category now that it is public'
+);
+
+-- Now-public row: alice's USING clause ("mine AND still private") no
+-- longer matches at all, so this update is a silent no-op, not an error.
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+update public.device_categories set name = 'Renamed' where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001';
+
+select is(
+  (select name from public.device_categories where id = 'a0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  'Alice Test Category',
+  'alice (original owner) can no longer edit it now that it is public (update is a no-op)'
+);
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Diagrams + collaborators
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.diagrams (id, name, owner_id, data)
+     values ('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', 'Alice''s Rig', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'alice can insert her own diagram'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.diagrams where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  0,
+  'bob cannot see alice''s diagram before being added as a collaborator'
+);
+
+select throws_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.diagram_collaborators (diagram_id, user_id, permission)
+     values ('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', 'edit') $$,
+  '42501'::char(5), null,
+  'bob cannot add himself as a collaborator on alice''s diagram'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.diagram_collaborators (diagram_id, user_id, permission)
+     values ('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', 'view') $$,
+  'alice (owner) can add bob as a view-only collaborator'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.diagrams where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  1,
+  'bob can now see alice''s diagram as a view collaborator'
+);
+
+-- Bob's collaborator permission is 'view', so diagrams_update's USING
+-- clause doesn't match at all for him — silent no-op, not an error.
+update public.diagrams set name = 'Bob was here' where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001';
+
+select is(
+  (select name from public.diagrams where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  'Alice''s Rig',
+  'bob (view-only) cannot update alice''s diagram (update is a no-op)'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ update public.diagram_collaborators set permission = 'edit'
+     where diagram_id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' and user_id = '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222' $$,
+  'alice (owner) can upgrade bob to edit access'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ update public.diagrams set name = 'Bob was here' where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001' $$,
+  'bob (edit collaborator) can now update alice''s diagram'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.diagrams where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  0,
+  'carol (admin, not super admin) has no special visibility into alice''s diagram'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.diagrams where id = 'b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001'),
+  1,
+  'dave (super admin) can see any diagram'
+);
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Catalog submissions
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ insert into public.catalog_submissions (entity_type, proposed_data, submitter_id)
+     values ('device_category', '{"name":"Bob''s New Category"}'::jsonb, '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222') $$,
+  'bob can submit a new catalog entry for review'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.catalog_submissions where submitter_id = '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222'),
+  0,
+  'alice cannot see bob''s submission'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333', true);
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from public.catalog_submissions where submitter_id = '22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222'),
+  1,
+  'carol (admin) can see bob''s submission'
+);
+
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Profiles / role escalation
+-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111', true);
+
+select throws_ok(
+  $$ update public.profiles set role = 'admin' where id = '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111' $$,
+  '42501'::char(5), null,
+  'alice cannot promote her own role'
+);
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444', true);
+
+select lives_ok(
+  $$ update public.profiles set role = 'admin' where id = '11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111' $$,
+  'dave (super admin) can change another user''s role'
+);
+
+select * from finish();
+
+rollback;
diff --git a/vite.config.ts b/vite.config.ts
index 9f9b446..52c04f3 100644
--- a/vite.config.ts
+++ b/vite.config.ts
@@ -5,4 +5,11 @@ import { defineConfig } from 'vite'
 // https://vite.dev/config/
 export default defineConfig({
   plugins: [react(), tailwindcss()],
+  // Pinned (rather than Vite's default floating port) so local Supabase
+  // Auth's redirect allow-list (supabase/config.toml) stays valid instead of
+  // silently breaking if 5173 happens to be busy and Vite picks another one.
+  server: {
+    port: 5173,
+    strictPort: true,
+  },
 })